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ABSTRACT 
The efficiency of current cargo screening processes at sea 
and air ports is unknown as no benchmarks exists against 
which they could be measured. Some manufacturer 
benchmarks exist for individual sensors but we have not 
found any benchmarks that take a holistic view of the 
screening procedures assessing a combination of sensors 
and also taking operator variability into account. Just add-
ing up resources and manpower used is not an effective 
way for assessing systems where human decision-making 
and operator compliance to rules play a vital role. For such 
systems more advanced assessment methods need to be 
used, taking into account that the cargo screening process 
is of a dynamic and stochastic nature. Our project aim is to 
develop a decision support tool (cargo-screening system 
simulator) that will map the right technology and man-
power to the right commodity-threat combination in order 
to maximize detection rates. 
In this paper we present a project outline and highlight 
the research challenges we have identified so far. In addi-
tion we introduce our first case study, where we investigate 
the cargo screening process at the ferry port in Calais. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary goal of cargo screening at sea and air ports is 
to detect human stowaways, conventional, nuclear, chemi-
cal and radiological weapons and other potential threats. 
Due to the sheer volume of cargo being moved through 
ports between countries this is an extremely difficult task. 
In sea freight for example, 200 million containers are 
moved through 220 ports around the globe every year; this 
is 90% of all non bulk sea cargo (Dorndorf et al 2007). 
 Little is known about the efficiency of current cargo 
screening processes as no benchmarks exists against which 
they could be measured (e.g. % detected vs. % missed). 
Some manufacturer benchmarks are available for individ-
ual sensors, but only under laboratory conditions. It is rare 
to find unbiased benchmarks that have been measured in 
independent field tests under real world conditions. Fur-
thermore, we have not found any benchmarks that take a 
holistic view of the entire screening process assessing a 
combination of sensors and also taking operator skills, 
judgment and variability into account. 
 Our aim is to use simulation as tool to further the un-
derstanding of cargo screening systems. However, the dif-
ficulty of simulating such processes is the fact that finding 
someone or something in the cargo is a rare event. For ex-
ample, during the cargo screening operations at the sea port 
in Calais where operators search for stowaways hiding in 
or under lorries only approximately 0.2% of vehicles that 
have been checked are true positives (UK Border Agency 
2009). This challenge needs to be taken into account when 
designing the simulation models and techniques should be 
considered to carefully validate the simulation. The general 
approach for this is to accelerate the occurrence of the rare 
events by using importance sampling (Heidelberger, 1995). 
Another research field that might provide some useful 
ideas in this instance is Risk Analysis, which also looks at 
rare events. In particular aspects of normal accident theory 
or high reliability theory might be useful (Sagan 1993). 
 In our research we attempt to identify and test innova-
tive methods in order to advance the use of simulation for 
supporting decision making at the strategic and the opera-
tional level of the cargo screening process. Wilson (2005) 
confirms the usefulness of simulation for this and states 
that “Simulation modeling allows the analysis or prediction 
of operational effectiveness, efficiency, and detection rates 
(performance) of existing or proposed security systems un-
der different configurations or operating policies before the 
existing systems are actually changed or a new system is 
built, eliminating the risk of unforeseen bottlenecks, under- 
or over-utilization of resources, or failure to meet specified 
security system requirements.” 
 Our end goal is to have a plug and play software tool 
(cargo screening system simulator) that will map the right 
technology and manpower to the right commodity-threat 
combination in order to maximize the detection rate. The 
mapping process will be done via a multi-dimensional De-
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tection Rate Matrix (DRM). The development of this ma-
trix poses another research challenge, as we might not be 
able to collect the required data for all the commodity-
threat combinations from the real system. We want to fill 
the gaps in the DRM by simulating specific scenarios. Fi-
nally, we want to use the simulator to evaluate the integra-
tion of new sensor technology and to investigate how the 
new technology will improve detection efficiency. Simula-
tion seems to be the ideal tool for this, as it is not possible 
to easily make changes to the real systems or to experiment 
with the real systems. 
 At the heart of our simulator will be a system specific 
DRM. To learn more about the development of such matri-
ces we will conduct two case studies. We have chosen the 
case study sites based on the number of threats that are ap-
parent on those sites. In our first case study (seaport) we 
look at a single threat, stowaways. In our second case study 
(airport) we raise the complexity of the DRM and look at 
multiple threats (stowaways, weapons and drugs). The re-
search project is still at a very early stage. Therefore, we 
will not be able to present any results. Instead, we would 
like to use the workshop as a forum for a critical review of 
our intended research approach.  
2 A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Simulation modeling is used to support system design and 
analysis. In the context of the cargo screening process, 
some examples (e.g. Leone and Liu 2005; Wilson 2005) 
have been found that use simulation modeling to evaluate 
key design parameters for checked baggage security 
screening systems in airports, in order to balance equip-
ment cost, passenger and baggage demand, screening ca-
pacity, and security effectiveness in an attempt to meet the 
requirements imposed by the checked baggage screening 
explosive detection deadline established by the US Avia-
tion and Transportation Security Act. 
Another related subject is the enhancement of the se-
curity throughout the supply chain, i.e. achieving supply 
chain integrity (Closs and McGarrell 2004). Here, simula-
tion modeling is often used to analyze the system. For ex-
ample, Sekine et al (2006) use simulation and the response 
surface method for a trade-off analysis of port security in 
order to construct a set of Pareto optimal solutions. 
The development of a dynamic security airport simula-
tion is described by Weiss (2008). In contrast to the other 
papers mentioned so far, this simulation focuses on the 
human aspects in the system and employs the agent para-
digm to represent the behavior of attackers and defenders. 
Both, attacker and defender agents are equipped with the 
capability to make their individual decisions after assessing 
the current situation and to adapt their general behavior 
through learning from previous experiences. This allows 
accounting for rapid security adaptation to shifting threads, 
as they might be experienced in the real world. 
With regards to the DRM development a report has 
been found during the literature review that describes the 
development of such a matrix on an experimental basis 
(Klock 2005). The author evaluates several commercial 
off-the-shelf screening technologies in a controlled labora-
tory environment to determine their effectiveness in detect-
ing humans in air cargo containers. The results of the study 
are very useful as guidance for our own DRM develop-
ment, although the study has not been conducted as a field 
study, which we believe will have a big impact on the re-
sults, in particular the sensor performances. Furthermore, 
we are interested not only in the individual object but in 
the interaction between the different entities within the sys-
tem. We will take a holistic view on the entire process to 
be able to consider real world dynamics and we will con-
sider also organizational factors in our investigation. 
3 RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
As a general guidance, the decision support tool we intend 
to develop should help to identify the technology or com-
bination of technologies as well as organizational proc-
esses that will provide the best possible rate of threat detec-
tion, while minimizing false positives. We have split our 
research questions into two categories, one focusing on the 
simulator development and one focusing on the DRM de-
velopment. 
Research questions regarding the simulator: [a] What 
are the boundaries of the system to be modeled? [b] How 
much detail do we have to model to get some meaningful 
output? [c] How should we model people in our system 
(e.g. officers or stowaways) - as simple resources or as 
autonomous entities? [d] How can we get a good estimate 
on how many stowaways, weapons or drugs are passing the 
borders? 
In particular the last question will be quite difficult to 
answer. Using the Calais example again, we only know the 
number of stowaways failing to cross the border but not the 
number of those that are successful. How often do people 
try before they give up? There is a mathematical model 
that attempts to estimates the number of people that cross 
illegally the Mexican border (Epenshade 1995) but it fails 
to address the second aspect adequately.  
Research questions regarding the DRM: [e] What are 
the most suitable classification categories to be used for the 
matrix we want to develop? [f] What is the best way to de-
velop and validate a detection rate matrix for a system 
where the events to be modeled do not occur very fre-
quently? [g] What is the best way to develop and validate a 
detection rate matrix in absence of real data or when real 
data is incomplete, i.e. missing data for certain technology 
/ commodity / threat combinations? [h] Can we develop a 
framework to support the development of a DRM for dif-
ferent environments and threats? 
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Developing the required input distributions for model-
ing the detection of stowaways, weapons and other threats 
will be a challenge as we are dealing with rare events. We 
could use historic data and apply data mining as a tool to 
derive some patterns of occurrence but for this we would 
need a large amount of source data before we could draw 
valid conclusions. However, it is very likely that the sys-
tem under observation will have changed significantly over 
a longer period of time (e.g. detection methods, quality of 
intelligence, strategies of defenders/attackers, threats), 
which needs to be considered in the data analysis to derive 
the input distributions. 
4 DEVELOPMENT OUTLINE FOR THE 
DETECTION RATE MATRIX 
In order to map the right technology and manpower to the 
right commodity thread combination we want to develop a 
DRM. Simulation will support this in two ways: a) by vali-
dating those parts of the matrix that are known and b) by 
being able to fill in gaps with estimated values derived 
from simulation runs. This will be a multi-dimensional 
construct which might have a different number of dimen-
sions for the different application fields. 
We want to start with a simple DRM and then refine it 
by adding more dimensions. The first DRM will have two 
dimensions (1) and will be developed through collecting 
anecdotal evidence from system insiders and where anec-
dotal evidence is not available by simulating specific sce-
narios of interest. To do the simulation exercise we first 
need a valid representation of the real system in form of a 
simulation model. As we focus on the process, traditional 
DES will be the simulation technique we will use for this 
purpose. 
 
rate of detection = f (commodity & thread combina-
tion, specific scenario) 
(1) 
 
In order to keep the development of the first DRM simple 
(as this is only a proof of principle exercise) for the case 
study system we need for the development of the matrix, 
we will be looking for a system where the number of 
commodity / thread combinations is small. In later steps we 
will generalize the initial DRM (2). 
 
rate of detection = f (commodity, threat, sensor) (2) 
 
Sensors applicability is related to the type of commodity 
checked. For example, if one wants to detect stowaways in 
a lorry using CO2 probes which measure the level of car-
bon monoxide and the load consist of wood or wooden 
furniture which naturally exhumes carbon monoxide then 
the detector readings will be wrong. For this commodity 
the sensor is not useful and would produce many false 
positives, which means that in return many true negatives 
will stay undetected as time is wasted with manually in-
specting the wrong lorries. 
Next we want to add a fourth dimension to our DRM, 
namely cargo containment (3). This dimension will be de-
fined by several parameters (4). 
 
rate of detection = f (cargo containment, commod-
ity, threat, sensor) 
(3) 
 
cargo containment = f (type, wall thickness, wall 
density) 
(4) 
 
Type is important as some of the sensors might need to 
have access to the interior of the containment while others 
might be applicable to be used from the outside. Wall 
thickness and density is important as many sensors have 
limitations regarding the penetration of the containments, 
depending on the containment’s properties. 
 There are more dimensions one could add (e.g. origin, 
destination, shipping company, environmental conditions 
of test facility location etc.). Therefore, part of the research 
will have to deal with the question of which are the most 
relevant indicators of sensor efficiency? 
5 CASE STUDY #1 
For our first case study we have chosen the ferry port in 
Calais (France) that links Calais with Dover (UK). This 
site is ideal for beginning our study as the security meas-
ures in place focus only focus on detecting one threat, ille-
gal immigrants, or clandestines, as they are called by the 
UK Border Force. Clandestines are people found on a lorry 
with the aim to get into Britain without a passport or any 
other papers. These can be individuals or groups. Clandes-
tines come in hope of a better future in Britain, the lack of 
national identity cards and the possibility of illegal work. 
When clandestines do not succeed little or no publicity is 
printed, thereby perpetuating the false idea that clandesti-
nes are always successful. On the other hand, for every 
successful clandestine arriving in Britain the word goes out 
that the process is successful, which seems to generate 
even more attempts of illegal immigration (Brown 1995). 
In 2003, the UK moved its border controls to Calais 
and operates in the harbor area to prevent people from en-
tering the UK. There are two check points, one run by the 
French and one run by the UK. Various detection methods 
are in use at these points: heart beat detectors, passive mil-
limeter wave sensors, CO2 probes, and body detection 
dogs. Between April 2007 and April 2008 the border has 
been passed by more than 900.000 lorries, of which in 
approx 0.2% some additional human freight was found. 
How many clandestines were missed during these checks is 
unknown. Although the companies supplying the detection 
equipment claim detection rates in the region of 100%, the 
experience in the field is somewhat different. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
As we are just at the beginning of our project, we hope that 
on the workshop we will get some additional ideas on how 
to estimate the missing data and how else we can use simu-
lation to better understand the current situation and the im-
pact of future investment. So far, we have built a first 
model of the cargo screening process of our case study sys-
tem. For this we have used AnyLogic 6 and its enterprise 
library.  
In the future we plan to implement some attacker-
defender scenarios, considering the evolution of defender’s 
and attacker’s strategies over time. This would require get-
ting away from focusing on the process and moving toward 
focusing on the behavior of the actors. As DES usually 
models people as resources it is not well suited for this 
task. ABS is commonly used for modeling such kind of 
scenarios. 
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